Naked exclusion under exclusive-offer competition

Arbeitspapier

This study constructs a model of anticompetitive exclusive-offer competition between two existing upstream firms. Under exclusive-offer competition, the upstream firm's profit depends on the rival's exclusive offer. If the rival makes an exclusive offer acceptable for the downstream firm, the upstream firm is excluded unless it succeeds in exclusion. Consequently, the upper bound of exclusive offers becomes higher than when one of the upstream firms is a potential entrant that cannot make any exclusive offer. Thus, the exclusion of the existing upstream firm can be an equilibrium outcome even in the case where the potential entrant is never excluded.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1021

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies ; Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices ; Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
• Subject: Antitrust policy ; Exclusive dealing ; Exclusive-offer competition ; Imperfect competition

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kitamura, Hiroshi ; Matsushima, Noriaki ; Sato, Misato
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
• (where): Osaka
• (when): 2018

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197694
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET