Arbeitspapier
Individual oath-swearing and lying under peer pressure
Previous studies have shown that an oath can reduce lying at an individual level. Can oaths reduce lying in groups, a context where the prevalence of lying is typically higher? Results from a lab experiment reveal that the impact of an oath on lying in a group context depends on the incentive structure. Oath reduces lying only when payoffs are independent. Evidence supports the notion that payoff interdependence creates pressure on individuals to conform to the group, crowding out the impact of oath on honest reporting. An implication is that to be effective in an organizational context, an oath intervention must be designed in strict connection with the incentive structures.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2023-069/I
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
- Subject
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Honesty oath
lying
group incentive
peer pressure
lab experiment
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kingsuwankul, Sorravich
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
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2023
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kingsuwankul, Sorravich
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2023