Fiscal federalism and European monetary integration

Arbeitspapier

The paper considers the role common fiscal arrangements might have to play in the operation of a European monetary union. In the first part of the study, we characterize an international fiscal incentive scheme which could reconcile different national macroeconomic preferences, thus supporting an intemational unanimity an monetary policy. The traditionaI argument for fiscal federalism arises from the fact that when countries face asymmetric cyclical fluctuations, pooling of tax revenues may be warranted from the stabilization point of view. Empirical results, presented in the second part of the paper, suggest that the amplitude of asymmetric fluctuations in the GDP is largest in the "fringe" countries of Europe, while the fluctuations in the "core" are more synchronized with pan-European developments.

Object Details

• ISBN: 951-686-310-8
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Bank of Finland Discussion Papers ; No. 2/1992

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Tarkka, Juha ; Åkerholm, Johnny
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Bank of Finland
• (where): Helsinki
• (when): 1992

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/211631
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET