Arbeitspapier

University Funding Policies: Buildings or Citizens?

Governments tend to fund universities based on the number of registered students and lump sum transfers. Such policy induces universities to compete for recruiting students, diverting money away from funds devoted to teaching. I show this degradation of quality increases with the degree to which universities compete for the same students. I suggest a policy that achieves the social optimum for any given level of funding. This policy shows that a university's funding rules should not be solely based on its enrollement, but also on the enrollment in competing universities.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1302

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Education
Higher Education; Research Institutions
Education: Government Policy
Thema
University
Funding Policies
Decentralized Decisions

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bouchard St-Amant, Pier-André
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kingston (Ontario)
(wann)
2013

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bouchard St-Amant, Pier-André
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2013

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