Arbeitspapier

University Funding Policies: Buildings or Citizens?

Governments tend to fund universities based on the number of registered students and lump sum transfers. Such policy induces universities to compete for recruiting students, diverting money away from funds devoted to teaching. I show this degradation of quality increases with the degree to which universities compete for the same students. I suggest a policy that achieves the social optimum for any given level of funding. This policy shows that a university's funding rules should not be solely based on its enrollement, but also on the enrollment in competing universities.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1302

Classification
Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Education
Higher Education; Research Institutions
Education: Government Policy
Subject
University
Funding Policies
Decentralized Decisions

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bouchard St-Amant, Pier-André
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(where)
Kingston (Ontario)
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bouchard St-Amant, Pier-André
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2013

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