Arbeitspapier
University Funding Policies: Buildings or Citizens?
Governments tend to fund universities based on the number of registered students and lump sum transfers. Such policy induces universities to compete for recruiting students, diverting money away from funds devoted to teaching. I show this degradation of quality increases with the degree to which universities compete for the same students. I suggest a policy that achieves the social optimum for any given level of funding. This policy shows that a university's funding rules should not be solely based on its enrollement, but also on the enrollment in competing universities.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1302
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
National Government Expenditures and Education
Higher Education; Research Institutions
Education: Government Policy
- Subject
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University
Funding Policies
Decentralized Decisions
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Bouchard St-Amant, Pier-André
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Queen's University, Department of Economics
- (where)
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Kingston (Ontario)
- (when)
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2013
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Bouchard St-Amant, Pier-André
- Queen's University, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2013