Do Shorter Product Cycles Induce Patent Thickets?

Arbeitspapier

The traditional argument that shorter product cycles favor trade secret over patenting is reviewed. A game theoretic model provides an argument that shorter product cycles can induce firms to file more patent applications. The firms may be trapped in a prisoners' dilemma where all firms would jointly prefer to patent less and to not have a patent thicket. If firms start applying for patents on technologies which are not yet mature in order to cover ideas that may eventually turn successful, this may create a patent thicket. The transition into a situation where firms start patenting many ideas instead of single mature technologies is initiated and accelerated when network effects are present or patents exhibit a blocking property.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 08-098

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
• Subject: patent thicket ; product cycles ; licensing ; network effects ; Patent ; Innovationswettbewerb ; Gefangenendilemma ; Network Externalities ; Lizenzvergabe ; Theorie ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Beschorner, Patrick Frank Ernst
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/27580
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET