Arbeitspapier

Regulation and investment in network industries: Evidence from European telecoms

We provide evidence of an inherent trade-off between access regulation and investment incentives in telecommunications by using a comprehensive data set covering 70+ fixed-line operators in 20 countries over 10 years. Our econometric model accommodates: different investment incentives for incumbents and entrants; a strategic interaction of entrants' and incumbents' investments; and endogenous regulation. We find access regulation to negatively affect both total industry and individual carrier investment. Thus promoting market entry by means of regulated access undermines incentives to invest in facilities-based competition. Moreover, we find evidence of a regulatory commitment problem: higher incumbents' investments encourage provision of regulated access.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2009,039

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Model Construction and Estimation
Regulation and Industrial Policy: Other
Telecommunications
Thema
Telecommunications
access regulation
unbundling
investment
Telekommunikation
Netzzugang
Unternehmensentflechtung
Investition
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Telekommunikationsinfrastruktur
Telekommunikationspolitik
Welt

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Grajek, Michał
Röller, Lars-Hendrik
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Grajek, Michał
  • Röller, Lars-Hendrik
  • Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk

Entstanden

  • 2009

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