Arbeitspapier
Regulation and investment in network industries: Evidence from European telecoms
We provide evidence of an inherent trade-off between access regulation and investment incentives in telecommunications by using a comprehensive data set covering 70+ fixed-line operators in 20 countries over 10 years. Our econometric model accommodates: different investment incentives for incumbents and entrants; a strategic interaction of entrants' and incumbents' investments; and endogenous regulation. We find access regulation to negatively affect both total industry and individual carrier investment. Thus promoting market entry by means of regulated access undermines incentives to invest in facilities-based competition. Moreover, we find evidence of a regulatory commitment problem: higher incumbents' investments encourage provision of regulated access.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2009,039
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Model Construction and Estimation
Regulation and Industrial Policy: Other
Telecommunications
- Thema
-
Telecommunications
access regulation
unbundling
investment
Telekommunikation
Netzzugang
Unternehmensentflechtung
Investition
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Telekommunikationsinfrastruktur
Telekommunikationspolitik
Welt
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Grajek, Michał
Röller, Lars-Hendrik
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Grajek, Michał
- Röller, Lars-Hendrik
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
Entstanden
- 2009