Arbeitspapier

Information asymmetries and securitization design

The strong growth in collateralized debt obligation transactions raises the question how these transactions are designed. The originator designs the transaction so as to maximize her benefit subject to requirements imposed by investors and rating agencies. An important issue in these transactions is the information asymmetry between the originator and the investors. First Loss Positions are the most important instrument to mitigate conflicts due to information asymmetry. We analyse the optimal size of the First Loss Position in a model and the actual size in a set of European collateralized debt obligation transactions. We find that the asset pool quality, measured by the weighted average default probability and the diversity score of the pool, plays a predominant role for the transaction design. Characteristics of the originator play a small role. A lower asset pool quality induces the originator to take a higher First Loss Position and, in a synthetic transaction, a smaller Third Loss Position. The First Loss Position bears on average 86 % of the expected default losses, independent of the asset pool quality. This loss share and the asset pool quality strongly affect the rating and the credit spread of the lowest rated tranche.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CoFE Discussion Paper ; No. 07/10

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage; Ratings and Ratings Agencies
Thema
Securitization
collateralized debt obligations
asset pool quality
First Loss Position
synthetic transactions
tranching

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Franke, Günter
Herrmann, Markus
Weber, Thomas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Konstanz, Center of Finance and Econometrics (CoFE)
(wo)
Konstanz
(wann)
2007

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-opus-116638
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Franke, Günter
  • Herrmann, Markus
  • Weber, Thomas
  • University of Konstanz, Center of Finance and Econometrics (CoFE)

Entstanden

  • 2007

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