Generalised Reciprocity and Reputation in the Theory of Cooperation: A Framework

Abstract: We study the Iterated Bilateral Reciprocity game in which the need for help arises randomly. Players are heterogeneous with respect to ‘neediness’ i.e. probability of needing help. We find bounds on the amount of heterogeneity which can be tolerated for cooperation (all players help when asked to help) to be sustainable in a collectivity. We introduce the notion of Generalised Reciprocity. Individuals make a costly first move to benefit another under the reasonable expectation that either the other or somebody else will reciprocate. We hope that these tentative attempts at extending Axelrod’s seminal work on cooperation will inspire future efforts in the field of organisational culture and social theory more generally.

Standort
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Umfang
Online-Ressource
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Generalised Reciprocity and Reputation in the Theory of Cooperation: A Framework ; volume:22 ; number:1 ; year:2000 ; pages:3-18 ; extent:16
Analyse & Kritik ; 22, Heft 1 (2000), 3-18 (gesamt 16)

Urheber
Abell, Peter
Reyniers, Diane

DOI
10.1515/auk-2000-0101
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2404171608005.161245197409
Rechteinformation
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Letzte Aktualisierung
14.08.2025, 11:02 MESZ

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Beteiligte

  • Abell, Peter
  • Reyniers, Diane

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