Arbeitspapier

Quality competition or quality cooperation? License-type and the strategic nature of open source vs. closed source business models

In the ICT sector, product-software is an important factor for the quality of the products (e.g. cell phones). In this context, open source software enables firms to avoid quality competition as they can cooperate on quality without an explicit contract. The economics of open source (OS) versus closed source (CS) business models are analyzed in a general two- stage model that combines aspects of non-cooperative R&D with the theory of differentiated oligopolies: In stage one, firms develop software, either as OS or CS, or as a an OS-CS-mix if the license allows. In stage two, firms bundle this with complementary products and compete à la Cournot. The model allows for horizontal product differentiation in stage two. The finding are: 1.) While CS-decisions are always strategic substitutes, OS-decisions can be strategic complements. Furthermore, CS is a strategic substitute to OS and vice versa. 2.) The type of OS-license plays a crucial role: only if the license prohibits a direct OS-CS code mix (like the GPL), then Nash-equilibria with firms producing OS code exist for all parameters. 3.) In the equilibrium of a mixed industry with restricted licenses, OS-firms offer lower quality than their CS-rivals.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2010,034

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Open Source Products and Markets
Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
Thema
open source
commercial open source
Cournot
R&D
Softwareindustrie
Oligopol
Lizenzvergabe
Open Source
Produktdifferenzierung
Wettbewerb
Produktqualität
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
von Engelhardt, Sebastian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
(wo)
Jena
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • von Engelhardt, Sebastian
  • Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2010

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