Arbeitspapier

Seemingly irresponsible but welfare improving fiscal policy at the lower bound

In this paper, we evaluate the consequences of super-active fiscal policy rules - that is, rules that call for tax cuts and/or spending increases as the government's debt level rises - in a standard New Keynesian model subject to an occasionally-binding zero lower bound on the monetary policy interest rate. We show that such seemingly irresponsible, debt-financed fiscal stimulus at the ZLB, unbacked by any promise of future tax increases or spending cuts, not only improves economic stability by acting as an automatic stabilizer, but also, somewhat paradoxically, reduces government debt accumulation. When evaluated using a model-consistent measure of welfare, fiscal rules calibrated to the U.S. response during both the Great Recession and COVID recession, combined with a weak monetary policy response to inflation, outperform a monetary policy that responds strongly to inflation and reduce the frequency of episodes at the ZLB.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Sveriges Riksbank Working Paper Series ; No. 410

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
Monetary Policy
Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
Thema
automatic stabilizers
fiscal and monetary interactions
government debt

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Billi, Roberto M.
Walsh, Carl E.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Sveriges Riksbank
(wo)
Stockholm
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Billi, Roberto M.
  • Walsh, Carl E.
  • Sveriges Riksbank

Entstanden

  • 2022

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