Does category reporting increase donations to charity? A signalling game approach

Arbeitspapier

Many charities report donations using categories. We question whether such category reporting increases donations in a signalling game where a donor is either generous or not generous. Conditions are derived under which category reporting will increase giving or decrease giving. Category reporting will increase giving if the probability a donor is generous is low and/or donor preferences depend a lot on type. Category reporting will decrease giving if the probability a donor is generous is high and/or donor preferences depend little on type.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: School of Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 09,24

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Public Goods
• Subject: public good ; charity ; category reporting ; signalling ; Spende ; Öffentliches Gut ; Signalling ; Spieltheorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Cartwright, Edward ; Patel, Amrish
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Kent, School of Economics
• (where): Canterbury
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50573
• Last update: 11.06.200254, 9:22 AM CEST