Arbeitspapier
Does category reporting increase donations to charity? A signalling game approach
Many charities report donations using categories. We question whether such category reporting increases donations in a signalling game where a donor is either generous or not generous. Conditions are derived under which category reporting will increase giving or decrease giving. Category reporting will increase giving if the probability a donor is generous is low and/or donor preferences depend a lot on type. Category reporting will decrease giving if the probability a donor is generous is high and/or donor preferences depend little on type.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: School of Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 09,24
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Public Goods
- Thema
-
public good
charity
category reporting
signalling
Spende
Öffentliches Gut
Signalling
Spieltheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Cartwright, Edward
Patel, Amrish
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Kent, School of Economics
- (wo)
-
Canterbury
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Cartwright, Edward
- Patel, Amrish
- University of Kent, School of Economics
Entstanden
- 2009
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