Losing the lead: Patents and the disclosure requirement

Arbeitspapier

This paper analyzes the patenting decision of a successful inventor in a model of dynamic technology adoption with asymmetric firms. We show that the extent of the inventor's technological headstart is decisive for his patenting behavior. The overall patenting effect consists of two parts, a protective and a disclosure effect. If the technological headstart is high the negative disclosure effect may overcompensate the positive protective effect of a patent.In this case the inventor prefers secrecy. Welfare considerations show that a patent may be socially desirable even though it delays the first adoption of a new technology.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 296

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Industrialization; Manufacturing and Service Industries; Choice of Technology ; Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes ; Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
• Subject: patenting decision ; Secrecy ; disclosure requirement ; technology adoption ; patent height ; Patent ; Entscheidung ; Geheimhaltung ; Publizitätspflicht ; Innovationswettbewerb ; Wohlfahrtseffekt ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Zaby, Alexandra K.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät
• (where): Tübingen
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/40301
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-opus-20528
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET