Arbeitspapier

Licensing innovations: The case of the inside patent holder

The present paper reconsiders the inside innovators' licensing problem under incomplete information. Employing an optimal mechanism design approach, we show that, contrary to what is claimed in the literature, the optimal mechanism may prescribe fixed fees, royalty rates lower than the cost reduction, and even negative royalty rates.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 510

Classification
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Auctions
Rationing; Licensing
Subject
innovation
licensing
industrial organization

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Fan, Cuihong
Jun, Byoung Heon
Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2015

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.24906
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-24906-7
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Fan, Cuihong
  • Jun, Byoung Heon
  • Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2015

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