Artikel
Information and targeted spending
We present an electoral theory on the public provision of local public goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We show that electoral incentives lead to greater spending if the electorate is not well informed. A more informed electorate induces candidates to target funds only to specific constituencies, which can reduce aggregate welfare
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 14 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 373-402 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Public Goods
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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Local public goods
information
elections
targeted spending
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Eguia, Jon X.
Nicolò, Antonio
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The Econometric Society
- (where)
-
New Haven, CT
- (when)
-
2019
- DOI
-
doi:10.3982/TE2508
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Eguia, Jon X.
- Nicolò, Antonio
- The Econometric Society
Time of origin
- 2019
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