Arbeitspapier
Tax competition in the European Union
Tax competition poses two problems for international cooperation: defection and distributive conflict. Multilateral cooperation to stop tax competition may fail because states face incentives to renege on their promises or because they face adverse distributional consequences, either of which makes cooperation an unattractive option for them. Conventional wisdom in international relations concentrates on the first problem, highlighting that the problem of tax competition resembles a Prisoner's dilemma. We argue instead that it is the peculiar distributional consequences of tax competition which explain why all attempts to regulate it cooperatively have failed. Combining theoretical analysis with empirical research on the European Union's unsuccessful record of tax cooperation, we show how distributive, within-group conflict amongst potential cooperators interacts with the constraints imposed by a non-cooperating outside world to make multilateral tax cooperation an especially elusive goal for international collaboration.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: MPIfG Discussion Paper ; No. 98/3
- Classification
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Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie, Anthropologie
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Dehejia, Vivek H.
Genschel, Philipp
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung
- (where)
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Köln
- (when)
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1998
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Dehejia, Vivek H.
- Genschel, Philipp
- Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung
Time of origin
- 1998
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Tax competition and tax coordination in the European Union: A survey
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Tax Competition for FDI in Central-European Countries
Tax competition and tax revenues
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Hotelling Tax Competition
Tax Competition in a Fiscal Union with Decentralized Leadership
Company Tax Reform in the European Union
Follow the leader? Evidence on European and US tax competition
The adjustment of Moldova's competition law to European Union competition law
Tax competition in an expanding European Union
Tax competition and tax coordination in the European Union: A survey
Company tax coordination cum tax rate competition in the European Union
Company Tax Coordination cum Tax Rate Competition in the European Union
Tax Competition for FDI in Central-European Countries
Tax competition and tax revenues
Tax competition and tax structure in open federal economies: evidence from OECD countries with implications for the European Union
Hotelling Tax Competition
Tax Competition in a Fiscal Union with Decentralized Leadership
Company Tax Reform in the European Union
Follow the leader? Evidence on European and US tax competition