Arbeitspapier
Wholesale price discrimination and parallel imports
We develop a model of vertical pricing in which an original manufacturer sets wholesale prices in two markets integrated at the distributor level by parallel imports (PI). In this context we show that if competition policy requires uniform wholesale prices across locations it would push retail prices toward convergence as transportation costs fall. However, these retail prices could be higher than those induced without restrictions on prices charged to distributors. Thus, the competition policy may not be optimal for consumer welfare.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1951
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Economic Integration
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Antitrust Law
- Thema
-
Parallelimport
Marktintegration
Preisdifferenzierung
Vertikale Konzentration
Wettbewerbspolitik
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ganslandt, Mattias
Maskus, Keith E.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ganslandt, Mattias
- Maskus, Keith E.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2007