Wholesale price discrimination and parallel imports

Arbeitspapier

We develop a model of vertical pricing in which an original manufacturer sets wholesale prices in two markets integrated at the distributor level by parallel imports (PI). In this context we show that if competition policy requires uniform wholesale prices across locations it would push retail prices toward convergence as transportation costs fall. However, these retail prices could be higher than those induced without restrictions on prices charged to distributors. Thus, the competition policy may not be optimal for consumer welfare.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1951

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Economic Integration ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; Antitrust Law
• Subject: Parallelimport ; Marktintegration ; Preisdifferenzierung ; Vertikale Konzentration ; Wettbewerbspolitik ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ganslandt, Mattias ; Maskus, Keith E.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25996
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET