Arbeitspapier
Countervailing power and dynamic efficiency
This paper studies the impact of buyer power on dynamic efficiency. We consider a bargaining model in which buyer power arises endogenously from size and may impact on a supplier's incentives to invest in lower marginal cost. We challenge the view frequently expressed in policy circles that the exercise of buyer power stifles suppliers' incentives. Instead, we find that the presence of larger buyers keeps a supplier 'more on his toes' and induces him to improve the competitiveness of his offering, in terms of both price and quality, relative to buyers' alternative options.
- ISBN
-
978-3-86304-000-0
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 01
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Buyer Power
Countervailing Power
Dynamic Efficiency
Nachfragemacht
Lieferanten-Kunden-Beziehung
Gegengewichtige Marktmacht
Wirtschaftliche Effizienz
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Inderst, Roman
Wey, Christian
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (wo)
-
Düsseldorf
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Inderst, Roman
- Wey, Christian
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Entstanden
- 2010
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
An equilibrium analysis of efficiency gains from mergers
Buyer power and supplier incentives
Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives
Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power
Verhandlungsmacht und Gewerkschaftswettbewerb
Nachfragemacht im Handel
Compatibility investments in duopoly with demand side spillovers under different degrees of cooperation
How to counter union power? Equilibrium mergers in international oligopoly
Buyer power and supplier incentives
Compatibility investments in duopoly with demand side spillovers under different degrees of cooperation
Raising rivals' costs through buyer power
One-stop shopping behavior, buyer power, and upstream merger incentives
An equilibrium analysis of efficiency gains from mergers
Buyer power and supplier incentives
Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives
Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power
Verhandlungsmacht und Gewerkschaftswettbewerb
Nachfragemacht im Handel
Compatibility investments in duopoly with demand side spillovers under different degrees of cooperation
How to counter union power? Equilibrium mergers in international oligopoly
Buyer power and supplier incentives
Compatibility investments in duopoly with demand side spillovers under different degrees of cooperation
Raising rivals' costs through buyer power
One-stop shopping behavior, buyer power, and upstream merger incentives
An equilibrium analysis of efficiency gains from mergers
Buyer power and supplier incentives
Buyer Power and Supplier Incentives
Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power
Verhandlungsmacht und Gewerkschaftswettbewerb
Nachfragemacht im Handel
Compatibility investments in duopoly with demand side spillovers under different degrees of cooperation
How to counter union power? Equilibrium mergers in international oligopoly
Buyer power and supplier incentives
Compatibility investments in duopoly with demand side spillovers under different degrees of cooperation
Raising rivals' costs through buyer power