College Curriculum, Diverging Selectivity, and Enrollment Expansion

Arbeitspapier

We analyze the impact of expansion of higher education on student outcomes in the context of competition among colleges which differentiate themselves horizontally by setting curricular standards. When public or economic pressures compel less selective colleges to lower their curricular demands, low-ability students benefit at the expense of medium-ability students. This reduces competitive pressure faced by more selective colleges, which therefore adopt more demanding curricula to better serve their most able students. This stylized model of curricular product differentiation in higher education offers an explanation for the diverging selectivity trends of American colleges. It also appears consistent with the U-shaped earnings growth profile we observe among college-educated workers in the U.S.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 6122

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Analysis of Education ; Higher Education; Research Institutions ; Education and Inequality ; Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; Publicly Provided Goods: Mixed Markets
• Subject: curricular standard ; higher education ; college selectivity ; enrollment expansion ; income distribution

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Kaganovich, Michael ; Su, Xuejuan
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/147376
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET