Arbeitspapier
Genetic testing and repulsion from chance
A central theme in the international debate on genetic testing concerns the extent to which insurance companies should be allowed to use genetic information in their design of insurance contracts. We analyze this issue within a model with the following important feature: A person’s well-being depends on the perceived probability of becoming ill in the future in a way that varies among individuals. We show that both tested high-risks and untested individuals are equally well off whether or not test results can be used by insurers. Individuals who test for being low-risks, on the other hand, are made worse off by not being able to verify this to insurers. This implies that verifiability dominates nonverifiability in an ex-ante sense.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2003,20
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Analysis of Health Care Markets
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- Thema
-
Genetic testing
asymmetric information
insurance
Gentechnik
Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung
Private Krankenversicherung
Asymmetrische Information
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hoel, Michael
Iversen, Tor
Nilssen, Tore
Vislie, Jon
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Oslo
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hoel, Michael
- Iversen, Tor
- Nilssen, Tore
- Vislie, Jon
- University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2003
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Genetic Testing and Repulsion from Chance
Adverse Selection vs Discrimination Risk with Genetic Testing. An Experimental Approach
Welfare Impacts of Genetic Testing in Health Insurance Markets: Will Cross-Subsidies Survive?
Genetic Testing When There is a Mix of Compulsory and Voluntary Health Insurance
Genetic testing when there is a mix of public and private health insurance
Testing out contractual incompleteness : evidence from soccer
Genetic Diversity and Performance: Evidence from Fooball Data
Testing for Marginal Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment
Testing excess returns from passive options investment strategies
Developing expenditure questions: Findings from R1 cognitive testing
Developing expenditure questions: Findings from R2 cognitive testing
Testing
Genetic Testing and Repulsion from Chance
Adverse Selection vs Discrimination Risk with Genetic Testing. An Experimental Approach
Welfare Impacts of Genetic Testing in Health Insurance Markets: Will Cross-Subsidies Survive?
Genetic Testing When There is a Mix of Compulsory and Voluntary Health Insurance
Genetic testing when there is a mix of public and private health insurance
Testing out contractual incompleteness : evidence from soccer
Genetic Diversity and Performance: Evidence from Fooball Data
Testing for Marginal Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment
Testing excess returns from passive options investment strategies
Developing expenditure questions: Findings from R1 cognitive testing
Developing expenditure questions: Findings from R2 cognitive testing
Testing
Genetic Testing and Repulsion from Chance
Adverse Selection vs Discrimination Risk with Genetic Testing. An Experimental Approach
Welfare Impacts of Genetic Testing in Health Insurance Markets: Will Cross-Subsidies Survive?
Genetic Testing When There is a Mix of Compulsory and Voluntary Health Insurance
Genetic testing when there is a mix of public and private health insurance
Testing out contractual incompleteness : evidence from soccer
Genetic Diversity and Performance: Evidence from Fooball Data
Testing for Marginal Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment
Testing excess returns from passive options investment strategies
Developing expenditure questions: Findings from R1 cognitive testing
Developing expenditure questions: Findings from R2 cognitive testing