Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel
Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem
"In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relationship-specific investments to be allocated by bargaining. This paper investigates the corresponding investment incentives if individuals have heterogeneous fairness preferences and thus differ in their bargaining behavior. Individual preferences are taken to be private information. Investments can then signal preferences and thereby influence beliefs and bargaining behavior. In consequence, individuals might choose high investments in order not to signal information that is unfavorable in the ensuing bargaining." [author's abstract]
- Extent
-
Seite(n): 486-494
- Language
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Englisch
- Notes
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Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 71(2)
- Subject
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Psychologie
angewandte Psychologie
Fairness
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Siemens, Ferdinand A. von
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (when)
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2009
- DOI
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-286081
- Rights
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GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
- Last update
-
21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Zeitschriftenartikel
Associated
- Siemens, Ferdinand A. von
Time of origin
- 2009
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