The political economy of post-compulsory education policy with endogenous credit constraints

Arbeitspapier

Altruistic parents, who differ in income, make financial transfers to their children, who differ in ability. The children invest in post-compulsory education, subject to an endogenous credit constraint, and taking policy as given. There are two policy tools: a subsidy to those who participate in education and a proportional income tax. Not all children participate; a larger subsidy encourages participation, and a larger income tax discourages it. The parents, prior to making transfers, vote on policy. A voting equilibrium, if it exists, is such that voters in the two tails of the income distribution support a reduction, while the “middle-class” supports an expansion, of the education subsidy. Public support of education is a policy with regressive elements as it entails, among other things, a redistribution from the poor to the middle-earners. We characterise a local equilibrium analytically, verify its existence numerically, and finally perform a number of comparative statics exercises.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2304

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; National Government Expenditures and Education ; Education: Government Policy
• Thema: Bildungspolitik ; Public Choice ; Bildungsfinanzierung ; Einkommensteuer ; Bildungsfinanzierung ; Verschuldungsrestriktion ; Subvention ; Eltern ; Soziale Schicht ; Wahlverhalten ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Anderberg, Dan ; Balestrino, Alessandro
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/26349
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 11.03.20252025, 23:44 MEZ