Arbeitspapier
The Climate Policy Hold-Up: Green Technologies,Intellectual Property Rights, and the Abatement Incentives of International Agreements
The success of global climate policies over the coming decades depends on the diffusion of 'green' technologies. This requires that international environmental agreements (IEAs) and trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) interact productively.Using a simple and tractable model, we highlight the strategic reduction in abatement commitments on account of a hold-up effect. In anticipation of rent extraction by the innovator signatories might abate less than non-signatories turning the IEA 'brown'. Self-enforcing IEAs have fewer signatories and diffusion can reduce global abatement under TRIPs. Countries hosting patent holders extract rents from TRIPs, but may be better off without them.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 591
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
International climate policy
diffusion of innovations
intellectual property rights
hold-up problem
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Goeschl, Timo
Perino, Grischa
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
- (wo)
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Heidelberg
- (wann)
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2015
- DOI
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doi:10.11588/heidok.00018633
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-186335
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Goeschl, Timo
- Perino, Grischa
- University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2015
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