Arbeitspapier

Would depositors like to show others that they do not withdraw? Theory and experiment

There is an asymmetry regarding what previous decisions depositors may observe when choosing whether to withdraw or keep the money deposited: it is more likely that withdrawals are observed. We study how decision-making changes if depositors are able to make their decision to keep their funds in the bank visible to subsequent depositors at a cost. We show theoretically in a Diamond-Dybvig setup that without this signaling option multiple equilibria are possible, while signaling makes the no-run outcome the unique equilibrium. We test if the theoretical predicitions hold in a lab experiment. We find that indeed when signaling is available, bank runs are less likely to arise and signaling is extensively used.

ISBN
978-615-5594-20-5
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2015/53

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Thema
Bank runs
Asymmetric information
Experimental evidence
Signaling

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kinateder, Markus
Kiss, Hubert János
Pintér, Ágnes
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics
(wo)
Budapest
(wann)
2015

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kinateder, Markus
  • Kiss, Hubert János
  • Pintér, Ágnes
  • Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2015

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