Arbeitspapier

Welfare-Maximising Investors? – Utility Firm Performance with Heterogeneous Quality Preferences and Endogenous Ownership

We model the endogenous ownership of a monopoly utility by either investors or the firm's customers. Ownership arises endogenously based on customers' quality preference, which affects each ownership type's viability. Customer ownership arises when quality preference falls below the threshold for profitable entry by investors, but above that for entry by customer-owners. When quality preferences diverge sufficiently, a profitmaximising investor-owned utility produces higher welfare than a welfare-maximising customer-owned firm, despite its higher prices. Otherwise, a customer-owned utility produces greater efficiency, quality and welfare, despite having lower-value customers. These predictions agree with empirical findings for US utilities, and find direct support using data from Electricity Distribution Businesses in New Zealand. To reflect ownership endogeneity, we instrument for ownership changes using the staggered rollout of regional air quality regulations. Our findings suggest that performance comparisons of customer- and investor-owned utilities should account for ownership endogeneity. This has implications for ownership debates, efficiency study specification, and the development of regulatory screens.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 2017/09

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Economics of Regulation
Electric Utilities
Cooperative Enterprises
Thema
Utilities
Price
Efficiency
Quality
Welfare
Ownership

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Meade, Richard
Soderberg, Magnus
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Auckland University of Technology (AUT), Faculty of Business, Economics and Law
(wo)
Auckland
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Meade, Richard
  • Soderberg, Magnus
  • Auckland University of Technology (AUT), Faculty of Business, Economics and Law

Entstanden

  • 2017

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