In search of lost time: Integrated information theory needs constraints from temporal phenomenology

Abstract: Integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness proposes an identity between its causal structure and phenomenology. Through this assertion, IIT aims to explain consciousness by prioritizing first-person experience. However, despite its phenomenology-first stance, developments in IIT have overlooked temporality. As such, we argue that at present IIT’s phenomenological analysis is incomplete. In this critique, we show how IIT takes a non-identical illusionist stance towards the experiences of continuity, flow, and extent of our experiences. Moreover, in isolating temporal grains of experience to a single timescale, IIT misses out on capturing the multi-scale nested nature of temporal phenomena. Hence, we contend that IIT needs an axiom for time, through which its causal structure can be refined to account for temporal experiences. Here, we propose an axiom to address these concerns. We conclude by discussing how IIT may need to be revised if our concerns hold true. https://philosophymindscience.org/index.php/phimisci/article/view/9438

Standort
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
Umfang
Online-Ressource
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
In search of lost time: Integrated information theory needs constraints from temporal phenomenology ; volume:3 ; year:2022
Philosophy and the mind sciences ; 3 (2022)

Urheber
Singhal, Ishan
Mudumba, Ramya
Srinivasan, Narayanan

DOI
10.33735/phimisci.2022.9438
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2022060912260666324332
Rechteinformation
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
Letzte Aktualisierung
15.08.2025, 07:30 MESZ

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Beteiligte

  • Singhal, Ishan
  • Mudumba, Ramya
  • Srinivasan, Narayanan

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