Arbeitspapier

On the welfare effects of credit arrangements

This paper studies the welfare effects of different credit arrangements and how these effects depend on the trading mechanism and inflation. In a competitive market, a deviation from the Friedman rule is always sub-optimal. Moreover, credit arrangements can be welfare-reducing, because increased consumption by credit users will drive up the price level so that money users have to reduce consumption when facing a binding liquidity restraint. By adopting an optimal trading mechanism, however, these welfare implications can be overturned. Price discrimination under the optimal mechanism helps internalize the price effects. First, small deviations from the Friedman rule are no longer welfare-reducing. Second, increasing the access to credit becomes welfare-improving. Finally, the model is extended to study the welfare effects of credit systems when credit serves as means of payment, and endogenous credit constraint.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2012-43

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Money and Interest Rates: General
Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General
Thema
Credit and credit aggregates
Payment, clearing, and settlement systems

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Chiu, Jonathan
Dong, Mei
Shao, Enchuan
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Canada
(wo)
Ottawa
(wann)
2012

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2012-43
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Chiu, Jonathan
  • Dong, Mei
  • Shao, Enchuan
  • Bank of Canada

Entstanden

  • 2012

Ähnliche Objekte (12)