Artikel
Job security, stability, and production efficiency
We study a two-sided matching market with a set of heterogeneous firms and workers in an environment where jobs are secured by regulation. Without job security Kelso and Crawford have shown that stable outcomes and efficiency prevail when all workers are gross substitutes to each firm. It turns out that by introducing job security, stability and efficiency may still prevail, and even for a significantly broader class of production functions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-24 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
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Matching
stability
labor market
job security
efficiency
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Fu, Hu
Kleinberg, Robert D.
Lavi, Ron
Smorodinsky, Rann
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
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New Haven, CT
- (wann)
-
2017
- DOI
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doi:10.3982/TE2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Fu, Hu
- Kleinberg, Robert D.
- Lavi, Ron
- Smorodinsky, Rann
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2017