Job security, stability, and production efficiency

Artikel

We study a two-sided matching market with a set of heterogeneous firms and workers in an environment where jobs are secured by regulation. Without job security Kelso and Crawford have shown that stable outcomes and efficiency prevail when all workers are gross substitutes to each firm. It turns out that by introducing job security, stability and efficiency may still prevail, and even for a significantly broader class of production functions.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 12 ; Year: 2017 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-24 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Auctions ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Subject: Matching ; stability ; labor market ; job security ; efficiency

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Fu, Hu ; Kleinberg, Robert D. ; Lavi, Ron ; Smorodinsky, Rann
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New Haven, CT
• (when): 2017

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3982/TE2016
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/197181
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET