Arbeitspapier
Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness
Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declared most desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position in the submitted ranking such that a strategic trade-off between preference intensity and match probability arises. This trade-off can trigger the commonly observed self-selection strategies. We show that misrepresentations can persist for arbitrarily small report-dependent components. However, honesty is guaranteed to be optimal if and only if there is no conflict between the quality and feasibility of a match.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 289
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Design
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
- Thema
-
Market design
matching
school choice
self-regarding preferences
strategy-proof mechanisms
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Meisner, Vincent
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
- (wo)
-
München und Berlin
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Meisner, Vincent
- Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
Entstanden
- 2021