Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness

Arbeitspapier

Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declared most desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position in the submitted ranking such that a strategic trade-off between preference intensity and match probability arises. This trade-off can trigger the commonly observed self-selection strategies. We show that misrepresentations can persist for arbitrarily small report-dependent components. However, honesty is guaranteed to be optimal if and only if there is no conflict between the quality and feasibility of a match.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 289

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Design ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
• Subject: Market design ; matching ; school choice ; self-regarding preferences ; strategy-proof mechanisms

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Meisner, Vincent
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition
• (where): München und Berlin
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/244329
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET