Arbeitspapier
Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy
We investigate the determinants of executive pay in a sample of Italian firms. To the best of our knowledge this is the first study on the compensation of Italian executives. We estimate that an increase of real profits per firm by 1 billion lire increases the pay of top executives by only 504 thousand lire, more than the increase found for middle management (184 thousand). Pay-performance sensitivity is stronger in firms where profits are declining and profit variability is relatively low. This sensitivity is lower in domestic-owned firms and in firms that are not affiliated to a multinational group, a result consistent with the main features of Italian capitalism.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 50.1997
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- Subject
-
Executive compensation
Principal-agent
Führungskräfte
Lohn
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Brunello, Giorgio
Graziano, Clara
Parigi, Bruno Maria
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (where)
-
Milano
- (when)
-
1997
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Brunello, Giorgio
- Graziano, Clara
- Parigi, Bruno Maria
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Time of origin
- 1997
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