Arbeitspapier
Environmental policy and growth when inputs are differentiated in pollution intensity
Environmental policy affects the distribution of market shares if intermediate goods are differentiated in pollution intensity. When innovations are environmental friendly, a tax on emissions skews demand towards new goods, which are the most productive. In this case along a balanced growth path the tax has to increase to keep the market shares of goods of different vintages constant. An increase in the burden of taxation lowers output on impact but, comparing balanced growth paths, we find that it spurs innovation. Through this channel environmental policy may increase the growth rate of the economy.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 16.2002
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Firm
Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights: General
- Thema
-
Endogenous growth
environmental policy
induced technological change
Umweltpolitik
Ökosteuer
Technischer Fortschritt
Wirtschaftswachstum
Neue Wachstumstheorie
Öko-Produkt
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ricci, Francesco
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2002
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ricci, Francesco
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2002
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