Arbeitspapier
The kernel is in the least core for permutation games
Permutation games are totally balanced transferable utility cooperative games arising from certain sequencing and re-assignment optimization problems. It is known that for permutation games the bargaining set and the core coincide, consequently, the kernel is a subset of the core. We prove that for permutation games the kernel is contained in the least core, even if the latter is a lower dimensional subset of the core. By means of a 5-player permutation game we demonstrate that, in sense of the lexicographic center procedure leading to the nucleolus, this inclusion result can not be strengthened. Our 5-player permutation game is also an example (of minimum size) for a game with a non-convex kernel.
- ISBN
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978-615-5447-10-5
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IEHAS Discussion Papers ; No. MT-DP - 2014/2
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
- Subject
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permutation game
least core
kernel
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Solymosi, Tamás
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
- (where)
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Budapest
- (when)
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2014
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Solymosi, Tamás
- Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies
Time of origin
- 2014
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