Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games

Arbeitspapier

This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 132.2005

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Monetary Policy ; Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
• Subject: Policy games ; policy ineffectiveness ; static controllability ; Nash equilibrium existence ; Nash-Gleichgewicht ; Wirtschaftspolitik ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni ; Acocella, Nicola
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/74181
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET