Transnational terrorims as a spillover of domestic disputes in other countries

Arbeitspapier

This paper models transnational terrorism as a three-way strategic interaction involving a government that faces armed opposition at home, which may spill over in the form of acts of terrorism by the state’s opponents against the government’s external sponsor. The external sponsor also utilizes deterrence against potential terrorists, which only lowers terrorism if terrorists are not intrinsically motivated by a deep-seated sense of humiliation. A rise in the external power’s preference for deterrence against terrorism may backfire in these circumstances. Increases in the government’s military efficiency against the rebels, who are also terrorists against the government’s sponsor raise overall levels of violence. – conflict ; terrorism ; civil war

Angaben zum Objekt

• ISBN: 9291903655
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: WIDER Discussion Paper ; No. 2002/120

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
• Thema: Politische Gewalt ; Theorie ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Addison, Tony ; Murshed, S. Mansoob
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
• (wo): Helsinki
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52790
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ