Transnational terrorims as a spillover of domestic disputes in other countries

Arbeitspapier

This paper models transnational terrorism as a three-way strategic interaction involving a government that faces armed opposition at home, which may spill over in the form of acts of terrorism by the state’s opponents against the government’s external sponsor. The external sponsor also utilizes deterrence against potential terrorists, which only lowers terrorism if terrorists are not intrinsically motivated by a deep-seated sense of humiliation. A rise in the external power’s preference for deterrence against terrorism may backfire in these circumstances. Increases in the government’s military efficiency against the rebels, who are also terrorists against the government’s sponsor raise overall levels of violence. – conflict ; terrorism ; civil war

Object Details

• ISBN: 9291903655
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WIDER Discussion Paper ; No. 2002/120

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government ; International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
• Subject: Politische Gewalt ; Theorie ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Addison, Tony ; Murshed, S. Mansoob
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER)
• (where): Helsinki
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/52790
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET