Subsidies for renewable energies in the presence of learning effects and market power

Arbeitspapier

We study the impact of learning by doing, learning spill-overs, and imperfect competition in a model with two types of electricity producers, an oligopolistic sector of polluting fossil-fuel utilities and a competitive fringe of non-polluting generators of electricity from renewable energy sources (RES-E). Furthermore we consider an upstream industry of RES-E equipment producers engaged in learning by doing. We show that a first-best policy requires two instruments, a tax in the fossil-fuel sector and an output subsidy for RES-E equipment producers. We then study second-best-optimal feed-in tariffs that are paid to the generators of RES-E. By means of simulations we calculate the welfare loss of a second-best-optimal feed-in-tariff policy and analyze how market structure impacts on second-best-optimal feed-in tariffs.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Kiel Working Paper ; No. 1689

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Alternative Energy Sources ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Technological Change: Government Policy
• Thema: Feed-in tariffs ; environmental subsidies ; learning by doing ; spill-overs ; market structure ; Förderung regenerativer Energien ; Stromtarif ; Administrierter Preis ; Second Best ; Ökosteuer ; Steuerwirkung ; Energietechnik ; Regenerative Energie ; Lernprozess ; Marktstruktur ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Reichenbach, Johanna ; Requate, Till
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
• (wo): Kiel
• (wann): 2011

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/45880
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ