Arbeitspapier
Does going easy on distressed banks help economic growth?
During banking crises, regulators often relax their normal requirements and refrain from closing financially troubled banks. I estimate the real effects of such regulatory forbearance by comparing differences in state-level economic outcomes by the amount of forbearance extended during the U.S. savings and loan crisis. To instrument for forbearance, I use historical variation in deposit insurance - and hence supervision - of similar financial intermediaries (thrifts) and exploit fixed differences between regional supervisors of the same regulator. The evidence suggests a policyinduced increase in high-risk loans during the official forbearance period (1982-89), followed by a broader bust in house prices and real GDP.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Staff Report ; No. 823
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Financial Crises
Crisis Management
- Thema
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financial crises
regulatory policy
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hundtofte, Sean
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Federal Reserve Bank of New York
- (wo)
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New York, NY
- (wann)
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2017
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hundtofte, Sean
- Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Entstanden
- 2017