Arbeitspapier

Does going easy on distressed banks help economic growth?

During banking crises, regulators often relax their normal requirements and refrain from closing financially troubled banks. I estimate the real effects of such regulatory forbearance by comparing differences in state-level economic outcomes by the amount of forbearance extended during the U.S. savings and loan crisis. To instrument for forbearance, I use historical variation in deposit insurance - and hence supervision - of similar financial intermediaries (thrifts) and exploit fixed differences between regional supervisors of the same regulator. The evidence suggests a policyinduced increase in high-risk loans during the official forbearance period (1982-89), followed by a broader bust in house prices and real GDP.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Staff Report ; No. 823

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financial Crises
Crisis Management
Thema
financial crises
regulatory policy

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hundtofte, Sean
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hundtofte, Sean
  • Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Entstanden

  • 2017

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