Arbeitspapier
Understanding Rating Addiction: US Courts and the Origins of Rating Agencies' Regulatory License (1900-1940)
This paper does challenge the "regulatory license" view that reliance by regulators on the output of rating agencies in the 1930s "caused" the agencies to become a central part of the fabric of the US financial system. We argue that long before the 1930s, courts began using ratings as financial community produced norms of prudence. This created "a legal license" problem, very analogous to the "regulatory license" problem and gave rise to conflicts of interest not unlike those that have been discussed in the context of the subprime crisis. Rating agencies may have had a responsibility in the Great Depression of the 1930s.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: EHES Working Papers in Economic History ; No. 44
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Flandreau, Marc
Slawatyniec, Joanna Kinga
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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European Historical Economics Society (EHES)
- (where)
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s.l.
- (when)
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2013
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Flandreau, Marc
- Slawatyniec, Joanna Kinga
- European Historical Economics Society (EHES)
Time of origin
- 2013
Other Objects (12)
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Understanding rating addiction: US courts and the origins of rating agencies' regulatory license (1900-1940)
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The Optimal Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies
An equilibrium model of credit rating agencies
Alternatives for issuer-paid credit rating agencies
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An Equilibrium Model of Credit Rating Agencies
Emergence of rating agencies: Implications for establishing a regional rating agency in Asia
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Understanding rating addiction: US courts and the origins of rating agencies' regulatory license (1900-1940)
Crises and rating agencies: On the effect of aggregate uncertainty on rating agencies' incentives to distort ratings
Herding Behavior between Rating Agencies
Rating "Agencies": How Regulation Might Help
Three essays on credit rating agencies
The Optimal Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies
An equilibrium model of credit rating agencies
Alternatives for issuer-paid credit rating agencies
Rating agencies and sovereign credit risk assessment
An Equilibrium Model of Credit Rating Agencies
Emergence of rating agencies: Implications for establishing a regional rating agency in Asia