When can lotteries improve public procurement processes?

Arbeitspapier

We study the potential benefits of adding a lottery component to cut the main risks associated with standard negotiated and rule-based auction procurement procedures. We show that adopting a two stage approach in which bureaucrats first negotiate with a small number of bidders to assess their eligibility and, next, rely on a lottery to award the contract reduces corruption risks often observed in negotiated procedures. For rule-based procedures, we show that a "third-price lottery" in which the two highest bidders are selected with equal probability and the project is contracted at a price corresponding to the third highest bid can reduce limited liability, renegotiation, bid rigging and collusion risks.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IDB Working Paper Series ; No. IDB-WP-01364

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Auctions ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
• Thema: rules ; discretion ; procurement ; lotteries ; corruption ; auctions

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Estache, Antonio ; Foucart, Renaud ; Serebrisky, Tomás
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
• (wo): Washington, DC
• (wann): 2022

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.18235/0004522
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ