Arbeitspapier

Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases

The popularity of open ascending auctions is often attributed to the fact that openly observable bidding allows to aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we compare three auctions that differ in how much information is revealed and in the potential activation of behavioral biases: (i) the ascending Vickrey auction, a closed format; and two open formats, (ii) the Japanese-English auction and (iii) the Oral Outcry auction. Even though bidders react to information conveyed in others’ bids, information aggregation fails in both open formats. In contrast, the Oral Outcry raises higher revenue than the other two formats, by stimulating bidders to submit unprofitable jump bids and triggering a quasi-endowment effect.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2020-071/I

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
ascending auctions
information aggregation
jump bidding
auction fever

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Offerman, Theo
Romagnoli, Giorgia
Ziegler, Andreas
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2020

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Offerman, Theo
  • Romagnoli, Giorgia
  • Ziegler, Andreas
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2020

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