Arbeitspapier

Central banks, trade unions and reputation - is there room for an expansionist manoeuvre in the European Union?

It is now a few years since the introduction of the common currency, and Europe is still experiencing high unemployment. The conventional logic attributes this problem to strong trade unions and other flaws in the labour market. This article takes a different approach. Using a game theoretic model we look at the changes that occur if trade unions and the central bank have different options to choose from in a climate of uncertainty. In a singlestage game the most probable outcome is a high unemployment rate as high as the NAIRU. However, there is also a slight chance that a central bank might take the risk associated with employment expansion (if trade unions cooperate the risk pays off). Moreover, results change dramatically if the game is repeated. This allows for effects on the trade union's reputation. It can be shown that this, in turn, improves the likelihood of employment expansion.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Arbeitspapiere für Staatswissenschaft ; No. 31

Klassifikation
Sozialwissenschaften, Soziologie, Anthropologie
Noncooperative Games
General Aggregative Models: Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian
Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
Central Banks and Their Policies
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Thema
Monetary Policy
labour unions
reputation building
employment
EMU
Geldpolitik
Lohnpolitik
Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion
Wiederholte Spiele
Reputation
Gewerkschaft
Vollbeschäftigung
Inflationsbekämpfung
Theorie
EU-Staaten

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Pusch, Toralf
Heise, Arne
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Universität Hamburg, Department Wirtschaft und Politik
(wo)
Hamburg
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Pusch, Toralf
  • Heise, Arne
  • Universität Hamburg, Department Wirtschaft und Politik

Entstanden

  • 2008

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