Arbeitspapier
Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: experimental evidence
We model experimentally the governance of an institution. The optimal management of this institution depends on the information possessed by insiders. However, insiders, whose interests are not aligned with the interests of the institution, may choose to use their information to further personal rather than institutional ends. Researchers (e.g., Palfrey 1990) and the business press have both argued that multiagent mechanisms, which inject trustworthy but uninformed "watchdog" agents into the governance process and impose penalties for conflicting recommendations, can implement institutionally preferred outcomes. Our laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion. In the experimental treatments in which watchdog agents were included, the intuitionally preferred allocation was implemented in the vast majority of cases. Surprisingly, implementation occurred even in the absence of penalties for conflicting recommendations.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2000-10
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Corporations - Finance
Game theory
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gillette, Ann B.
Noe, Thomas H.
Rebello, Michael J.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
- (wo)
-
Atlanta, GA
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gillette, Ann B.
- Noe, Thomas H.
- Rebello, Michael J.
- Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta
Entstanden
- 2000
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Voting in corporate boards with heterogeneous preferences
Does majority voting improve board accountability?
Does majority voting improve board accountability?
Culture, board composition and corporate social reporting in the banking sector
Design and cryptographic security analysis of e-voting protocols
Multi party computation : efficient protocols, general adversaries, and voting
The Gender Composition of Corporate Boards and Firm Performance: Evidence from Russia
Composition of secure multi-party protocols : a comprehensive study
The Japanese corporate board network
The Japanese corporate board network
Implementation-level analysis of cryptographic protocols and their applications to e-voting systems
Board characteristics and board committees in the Greek corporate governance
Voting in corporate boards with heterogeneous preferences
Does majority voting improve board accountability?
Does majority voting improve board accountability?
Culture, board composition and corporate social reporting in the banking sector
Design and cryptographic security analysis of e-voting protocols
Multi party computation : efficient protocols, general adversaries, and voting
The Gender Composition of Corporate Boards and Firm Performance: Evidence from Russia
Composition of secure multi-party protocols : a comprehensive study
The Japanese corporate board network
The Japanese corporate board network
Implementation-level analysis of cryptographic protocols and their applications to e-voting systems
Board characteristics and board committees in the Greek corporate governance
Voting in corporate boards with heterogeneous preferences
Does majority voting improve board accountability?
Does majority voting improve board accountability?
Culture, board composition and corporate social reporting in the banking sector
Design and cryptographic security analysis of e-voting protocols
Multi party computation : efficient protocols, general adversaries, and voting
The Gender Composition of Corporate Boards and Firm Performance: Evidence from Russia
Composition of secure multi-party protocols : a comprehensive study
The Japanese corporate board network
The Japanese corporate board network
Implementation-level analysis of cryptographic protocols and their applications to e-voting systems