Arbeitspapier
Do professional norms in the banking industry favor risk-taking?
In recent years, the banking industry has witnessed several cases of excessive risk-taking that frequently have been attributed to problematic professional norms. We conduct experiments with employees from several banks in which we manipulate the saliency of their professional identity and subsequently measure their risk aversion in a real stakes investment task. If bank employees are exposed to professional norms that favor risk-taking, they should become more willing to take risks when their professional identity is salient. We find, however, that subjects take significantly less risk, challenging the view that the professional norms generally increase bank employees' willingness to take risks.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 244
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
Field Experiments
- Thema
-
Risk culture
banking industry
experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Cohn, Alain
Fehr, Ernst
Maréchal, Michel André
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Zurich, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2017
- DOI
-
doi:10.5167/uzh-135996
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Cohn, Alain
- Fehr, Ernst
- Maréchal, Michel André
- University of Zurich, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2017
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Do Professional Norms in the Banking Industry Favor Risk-taking?
Abgangszeugnis Ernst Fehr
On the economics and biology of trust
On the Economics and Biology of Trust
Creating an Efficient Culture of Cooperation
Money Illusion and Coordination Failure
Obfuscation in competitive markets
Cooperativeness and impatience in the tragedy of the commons
Obfuscation in competitive markets
Social preferences: Fundamental characteristics and economic consequences
Social Preferences: Fundamental Characteristics and Economic Consequences
On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked
Do Professional Norms in the Banking Industry Favor Risk-taking?
Abgangszeugnis Ernst Fehr
On the economics and biology of trust
On the Economics and Biology of Trust
Creating an Efficient Culture of Cooperation
Money Illusion and Coordination Failure
Obfuscation in competitive markets
Cooperativeness and impatience in the tragedy of the commons
Obfuscation in competitive markets
Social preferences: Fundamental characteristics and economic consequences
Social Preferences: Fundamental Characteristics and Economic Consequences
On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked
Do Professional Norms in the Banking Industry Favor Risk-taking?
Abgangszeugnis Ernst Fehr
On the economics and biology of trust
On the Economics and Biology of Trust
Creating an Efficient Culture of Cooperation
Money Illusion and Coordination Failure
Obfuscation in competitive markets
Cooperativeness and impatience in the tragedy of the commons
Obfuscation in competitive markets
Social preferences: Fundamental characteristics and economic consequences
Social Preferences: Fundamental Characteristics and Economic Consequences