Arbeitspapier

Start-ups, Venture Capitalists, and the Capital Gains Tax

A model of start-up finance with double moral hazard is proposed. Entrepreneurs have ideas but lack own resources as well as commercial experience. Venture capitalists provide start-up finance and managerial support. Both types of agents thus jointly contribute to the firm's success, but neither type's effort is verifiable. We find that the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low venture capital support. In this situation, the capital gains tax is particularly harmful. The introduction of a small tax impairs managerial advice and leads to first order welfare losses. Once the tax is in place, limitations on loss off-set may paradoxically contribute to higher quality of venture capital backed entrepreneurship and welfare.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 742

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
venture capital
capital gains taxation
double moral hazard.

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Keuschnigg, Christian
Nielsen, Søren Bo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Keuschnigg, Christian
  • Nielsen, Søren Bo
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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