Arbeitspapier

Start-ups, Venture Capitalists, and the Capital Gains Tax

A model of start-up finance with double moral hazard is proposed. Entrepreneurs have ideas but lack own resources as well as commercial experience. Venture capitalists provide start-up finance and managerial support. Both types of agents thus jointly contribute to the firm's success, but neither type's effort is verifiable. We find that the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low venture capital support. In this situation, the capital gains tax is particularly harmful. The introduction of a small tax impairs managerial advice and leads to first order welfare losses. Once the tax is in place, limitations on loss off-set may paradoxically contribute to higher quality of venture capital backed entrepreneurship and welfare.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 742

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
venture capital
capital gains taxation
double moral hazard.

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Keuschnigg, Christian
Nielsen, Søren Bo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Keuschnigg, Christian
  • Nielsen, Søren Bo
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2002

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