Arbeitspapier
Postprivatization Corporate Governance: the Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection
We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in postprivatization corporate governance. We find that the government relinquishes control over time, mainly to the benefit of local institutions and foreign investors. We also show that private ownership tends to concentrate over time. In addition to firm-level variables, investor protection, political and social stability explain the cross-firm differences in ownership concentration. We find that the positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance matters more in countries with weak investor protection and that private domestic ownership leads to higher performance.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 37.2003
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
- Thema
-
Corporate governance
privatization
performance
Corporate Governance
Privatisierung
Eigentümerstruktur
Anlegerschutz
Schwellenländer
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Boubakri, Narjess
Cosset, Jean-Claude
Guedhami, Omrane
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Boubakri, Narjess
- Cosset, Jean-Claude
- Guedhami, Omrane
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2003