Arbeitspapier

Postprivatization Corporate Governance: the Role of Ownership Structure and Investor Protection

We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in postprivatization corporate governance. We find that the government relinquishes control over time, mainly to the benefit of local institutions and foreign investors. We also show that private ownership tends to concentrate over time. In addition to firm-level variables, investor protection, political and social stability explain the cross-firm differences in ownership concentration. We find that the positive effect of ownership concentration on firm performance matters more in countries with weak investor protection and that private domestic ownership leads to higher performance.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 37.2003

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Corporate Finance and Governance: Government Policy and Regulation
Thema
Corporate governance
privatization
performance
Corporate Governance
Privatisierung
Eigentümerstruktur
Anlegerschutz
Schwellenländer

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Boubakri, Narjess
Cosset, Jean-Claude
Guedhami, Omrane
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
(wo)
Milano
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Boubakri, Narjess
  • Cosset, Jean-Claude
  • Guedhami, Omrane
  • Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)

Entstanden

  • 2003

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