Arbeitspapier

Political Yardstick Competition, Economic Integration, and Constitutional Choice in a Federation

This paper investigates the behavior of rent-seeking politicians in an environment of increasing economic integration. The focus of the paper is on the implications of globalization-induced political yardstick competition for constitutional design with a view to the current discussion in the European Union. In contrast to the established literature, we carefully portray the double-tiered government structure in federal systems. The number of lower-tier governments and the allocation of policy responsibilities to the two levels of government are subject to constitutional choice.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 501

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Economic Integration
Federalism
Political Economy
Yardstick Competition

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bodenstein, Martin
Ursprung, Heinrich
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2001

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Bodenstein, Martin
  • Ursprung, Heinrich
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2001

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