Arbeitspapier

A portfolio of dilemmas: Experimental evidence on choice bracketing in a mini-trust game

Bracketing is a mental procedure about how people deal with multiple tasks. If a decision maker handles all the tasks at the same time, it is called broad bracketing. If she handles the tasks separately, e.g., one or a few tasks each time, it is called narrow bracketing. This paper experimentally investigates the effect of broad versus narrow bracketing in the context of a mini-trust game. The result shows that, in the narrow bracketing treatment, the investor (first mover) is more likely to place trust on others, but the receiver (second mover) is less likely to fulfill the trust under the same condition. The effect is partly conditional on beliefs in others' behavior.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ; No. 2012,06

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Subject
Framing
Choice Bracketing
Social Preference

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ding, Jieyao
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ding, Jieyao
  • Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Time of origin

  • 2012

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