Arbeitspapier

Structural separation and access in telecommunications markets

This paper presents a basic framework to assess whether structural (vertical) separation is desirable. It is discussed within the setting of fixed telecommunications markets. From an economist's perspective, the key question that underlies the case for structural separation is: is there a persistent bottleneck? The obvious candidate is the ?local loop?, or local access network. If yes then it makes sense to compare the costs and benefits of structural separation. The framework provides a set of options that the regulator can use strategically, by using the threat of a break-up to influence an incumbent's competitive stance in the wholesale market.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1554

Classification
Wirtschaft
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Economics of Regulation
Telecommunications
Subject
Telekommunikation
Betriebsaufspaltung
Netzzugang
Telekommunikationspolitik
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
de Bijl, Paul W. J.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2005

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • de Bijl, Paul W. J.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2005

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