Arbeitspapier
Structural separation and access in telecommunications markets
This paper presents a basic framework to assess whether structural (vertical) separation is desirable. It is discussed within the setting of fixed telecommunications markets. From an economist's perspective, the key question that underlies the case for structural separation is: is there a persistent bottleneck? The obvious candidate is the ?local loop?, or local access network. If yes then it makes sense to compare the costs and benefits of structural separation. The framework provides a set of options that the regulator can use strategically, by using the threat of a break-up to influence an incumbent's competitive stance in the wholesale market.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 1554
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Economics of Regulation
Telecommunications
- Subject
-
Telekommunikation
Betriebsaufspaltung
Netzzugang
Telekommunikationspolitik
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
de Bijl, Paul W. J.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2005
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- de Bijl, Paul W. J.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2005