Arbeitspapier
Critical loss analysis in market definition and merger control
The last couple of years have seen an increasing interest in critical loss analysis, both, in academia and in practice. This development is documented by various research papers, high-level exchanges between antitrust experts as well as an increasing number of case decisions which make use of some form of critical loss analysis. In this context, it is the aim of this article to describe the general method of critical loss analysis, to assess important properties of the concept, to show how critical loss analysis has to differ between market definition exercises and the evaluation of the competitive effects of horizontal mergers and to discuss applications of critical loss analysis in recent cases. The results suggest that the application of critical loss analysis in practice is often not as straightforward as the rather simple theoretical concept might suggest. In fact, the method has to be applied with great care in order to receive meaningful results.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 09-083
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Regulation and Industrial Policy: General
Antitrust Law
- Thema
-
Antitrust
competition policy
market power
market definition
merger control
unilateral effects
Konzentrationspolitik
Fusionskontrolle
Marktmacht
Messung
Relevanter Markt
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hüschelrath, Kai
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hüschelrath, Kai
- Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Entstanden
- 2009
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